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This article focuses on the financial and currency crises that
have occurred in the context of financial globalization in
Latin America. It is divided into four sections. The first
provides an overview of financial globalization in the last
three decades. The second offers a model applicable both to
the 1990s crises and those of the early 1980s. The third
examines other experiences of globalization that did not lead
to crises and analyses preventive measures in the light of
these. The fourth reviews the routes that lead to segmented
financial integration and touches on the problems of
international coordination.
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I
Three decades of financial globalization
in Latin America
The modern-day financial globalization process dates
back three decades. Its beginnings can be traced to
between 1971 and 1973, the period when the United
States broke the link between the dollar and gold and
the currencies of the main developed countries were
floated. The abandonment of the fixed exchange-rate
regime that had applied since the Bretton Woods
agreements transferred currency risk to the private
sector and stimulated the development of the currency
and currency derivatives markets (Eatwell, 1997).
Another early milestone was the oil price rise
decided on by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in 1973. The first oil shock resulted
in large trade imbalances, which had to be financed.
The eurodollar market experienced a sharp rise in
demand, while the surpluses of the oil exporting
countries supplied it with ample liquidity.
Financial globalization is a historical process with
two dimensions. One is the growing volume of cross-
border financial transactions; the other is the sequence
of institutional and legal reforms implemented to
liberalize and deregulate international capital
movements and national financial systems.
Quantitative growth and institutional and legal
changes have been mutually reinforcing. Competition
in capital markets has provided a major stimulus. As
deregulated international intermediaries began to
provide lower-cost services, this created pressure for
cost reductions and fewer regulations at the national
level. The new opportunities opening up in certain
countries drove deregulation of transactions between
countries (D’Arista, 2002).
Financial integration has always been mainly a
developed-country affair. It is notable, however, that
the largest economies in Latin America were part of
the globalization process from the start. First Brazil,
and then Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina and Chile were
large recipients of capital in the 1970s. These last two
countries, along with Uruguay, then pioneered drastic
liberalizing reforms which anticipated those that were
to be applied so widely in the 1990s.
The participation of Latin America in financial
globalization was interrupted by the debt crisis of the
1980s. This caused a hiatus of about eight years, during
which voluntary financing dried up. Then in the 1990s
the region re-entered the process vigorously, carrying
out drastic reforms and becoming a recipient of growing
flows (and ebbs) of capital. Just as the Mexican
moratorium of 1982 is said to have marked the
beginning of the debt crisis period, Mexico’s signing
of the first agreement under the Brady Plan may be
cited as a landmark in the commencement of the most
recent phase.1
1. International financing in the “lost decade”
The first period of strong capital inflows into developing
economies was cut short by profound internal and
external financial crises in 1981 and 1982. These crises
were followed by nationalization (through mechanisms
that differed from country to country) of many external
private-sector debts and by the establishment of an
institutional system whereby each country’s external
financing had to be settled by negotiation with lending
banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
During this period, the regime under which the region
operated was characterized by two stylized facts: i)
external financing was rationed and ii) negotiations with
creditors and international financial organizations
generally resulted in net transfers abroad on a scale
that was substantial in macroeconomic terms.
Consequently, it would be wrong to say that the region
became “detached” from globalization in the 1980s.
What happened was that the region was practically
An earlier version of this article was used as the basis for
discussion by Working Group II at the Second Plenary Meeting of
the Interparliamentary Forum of the Americas (Panama City, 20
and 21 February 2003). The author is grateful for the assistance of
Martín Rapetti and the remarks and suggestions of an anonymous
CEPAL Review referee.
1
 The renewed involvement of Latin America and the inclusion of
Asian and formerly Socialist countries as new emerging markets
led to a large increase in the scale of operations in the global
financial system.
41C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 0  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 3
GLOBALIZATION AND F INANCIAL CRISES IN  LATIN AMERICA  •  ROBERTO FRENKEL
debarred from obtaining new voluntary financing, but
continued to be strongly tied to the international system
by the negotiated service of debts contracted during
the earlier period.
Later, as a result of their early participation in
financial globalization and the economic disaster this
led to, a number of the region’s economies, particularly
the larger ones, went into the new financial boom of
the 1990s with a large legacy of external debt.
2. Events and ideas in the 1990s
After re-entering the international system in the early
1990s, the region experienced an upsurge in capital
flows that came to an abrupt end with the Mexican
crisis. The downturn was short and was followed by a
new influx, in which foreign direct investment (FDI)
was now more prominent. This cyclical pattern seems
to have come to an end with the Asian crisis, as will be
seen further on.
In the first of these booms, the predominant idea
was that this was the beginning of a long period of
growth in emerging-market capital inflows, part of an
international movement towards deeper financial links.
This was the basic diagnostic in multilateral
organizations and the region’s governments, and it was
a view generally shared by international intermediaries
and investors. It was thought that this process would
tend uninterruptedly towards the full integration of
emerging markets into a global market. The prospect
of a crisis was simply dismissed, and even less
consideration was given to the possibility of herd
movements like those that were subsequently to occur.
The scope and scale of the first upsurge in the 1990s
were due in part to investors thus underestimating the
risks, and this helped turn the strength of capital flows
into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Mexican crisis and
its aftermath laid bare the risks and revealed the extent
of volatility. They also, however, revealed the potential
effectiveness of international intervention, as the
unprecedented international assistance provided at that
time paved the way for a rapid recovery in financial
market confidence and allowed Mexico and other
countries affected by contagion (chiefly Argentina) to
meet all their financial obligations. This set the stage
for a new boom, which lasted until the Asian crisis.
3. After the Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises
Following recovery from the Asian, Russian and
Brazilian crises, the idea took hold that the international
financial integration process was cyclical in nature
(Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1996; IMF, 1997), so
that a new upturn was to be expected. This was the
belief, for example, of the economic authorities who
took office in Argentina in late 1999. This optimistic
outlook was encouraged by the relatively benign
character of the crisis in Brazil and the effectiveness of
the action taken by international agencies to forestall a
payment moratorium in most cases.
Other events, however, showed that the process had
taken a new direction. Firstly, net capital inflows did not
increase from the lows seen in 1998. Secondly, the risk
premiums of certain countries that were large enough to
have a significant effect on the average emerging
economy risk rating (and also the risk premiums of some
countries with smaller amounts of debt) remained
systematically high, never being less than double the risk
premium values of the boom periods. The countries’ asset
price dynamic also showed some novel features.
Movements in risk premiums and private-sector capital
flows were driven by new forms of contagion, in addition
to that resulting from individual country crises. The
effects of the oil price rise in 2000 and the NASDAQ
collapse in 2001 are examples of this.
The decline in flows from 1998 onward and the
change in their dynamic were associated with other
important shifts in the international context of the
1990s. These changes coincided with the ending of a
long period of expansion in the United States economy,
and thus with the demise of expectations that growth
would be continuous, without recessionary interludes.
These expectations had been rationalized by reference
to the novel circumstances supposedly created by the
“new economy” in the macroeconomic dynamic of the
United States.
Another event at this time was the bursting of the
technology share bubble in the United States and the
major negative wealth effect this had. The bubble
developed in parallel with the emerging market boom,
and it was these two types of assets that represented
between them the new high-yielding investment
opportunities at that time. The negative effects on
demand for emerging market assets caused by the
revision of earnings expectations and the losses
resulting from the collapse of “new economy” shares
were compounded by increased uncertainty.
As regards the supply of assets, the role played by
emerging markets in the region was likewise less
prominent at the end of the 1990s than it had been at
the beginning. The countries’ external sector, and thus
their ability to meet their external obligations, changed
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over the course of the decade, largely because of
globalization itself. The way they participated in the
international economy shifted over these years. The
counterpart of net capital inflows was an expansion in
the share of foreign capital and rising international debt
in the public and private sectors. This has been reflected
in the balance-of-payments current account by steady
growth in external factor rents. In some significant
cases, growth in capital rents has not been offset by net
export growth, and structural current-account deficits
have been the result. Many of the problems faced by
these countries result from this imbalance between
international finance and trade.
In the late 1990s, highly indebted countries
found that they needed resources to roll over their
debts and cover their current-account deficits, largely
generated by capital service payments (interest and
profits). The balance-of-trade deficit became less
important than the growing deficit in the financial
and factor services accounts. Although the situation
was not the same across the region, in 2001 it
involved countries such as Argentina and Brazil that
accounted for a large proportion of emerging-market
and Latin American debt. In late 2002, Argentina was




1. Crises in the recent phase
A number of Latin American countries have
experienced domestic and external financial crisis
during the phase that began in the 1990s, with dramatic
effects on the real economy. Crises generally entail high
economic and social costs and recession. Regional
contagion is another striking effect. A crisis in one
country has repercussions for financing costs and capital
flows in others. This phenomenon first came clearly to
light with the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995. The
“Tequila effect” swept the region and other emerging
markets and helped trigger the 1995 Argentine crisis.
Contagion effects were more pronounced in 1997 and
afterwards. The effects of the 1997-1998 Asian crisis
and the 1998 Russian crisis were universal, and not only
Brazil and Argentina, but other Latin American
countries that were more strongly placed, felt the impact
of contagion (Ffrench-Davis, 2001).
The crises in Mexico (1994-1995), Argentina
(1995), Brazil (1998-1999) and Argentina again (2001-
2002) broke out in the very countries that had received
the largest capital inflows during the preceding booms.
They are also the largest economies in Latin America
and the largest “emerging markets” in the region.
A brief review of these cases will be enough to
identify certain common features in the institutional
and economic policy situation at the time these crises
occurred: i) the nominal exchange rate was fixed or
semi-fixed; ii) the real exchange rate was high; iii) there
were virtually no barriers to the free movement of
capital; iv) capital inflows in the preceding boom had
been large in relation to the size of existing local money
and capital markets; v) the regulation of national
financial systems during the boom phase was weak and
permissive.3
Besides the characteristics mentioned, more
detailed analyses of these experiences reveal a cyclical
macroeconomic dynamic in all cases, with an initial
expansionary phase followed by a period of stagnation
or recession and growing financial weakness
domestically and externally, culminating in financial
and currency crises. The Argentine economy went
through this cycle twice in the decade, because the
convertibility regime outlasted the 1995 Tequila crisis.
After that year the Argentine economy went through
another brief expansion, supported by a fresh rise in
capital inflows that lasted until the Asian crisis. The
turning point of this second cycle came in 1998.
2
 The Brazilian bond market reopened in April 2003 and the
Government issued US$ 1 billion of new debt at 10.7%.
3
 System regulation was reformed and strengthened in Argentina
after the 1995 crisis, so that it had become more robust by the time
of the 1996-1997 upsurge in capital inflows. In Argentina, however,
there was systemic currency risk owing to the partial dollarization
of the domestic financial system. While banks had matched their
local dollar assets and liabilities and did not seem to face any
currency risk individually, much of their dollar lending was to
agents with peso income from non-tradable activities.
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The institutional and macroeconomic policy
conditions whose characteristics are listed above
resulted from the implementation of programmes that
combined reforms such as trade and capital-account
liberalization (plus privatization, fiscal reforms and
moves towards deregulation in other markets) with anti-
inflationary macroeconomic policies in which fixed or
semi-fixed exchange rates played a crucial role. Mexico
implemented a programme of this sort in 1988,
Argentina in 1991 and Brazil in 1994.
2. Experiments in the Southern Cone
It was mentioned above that some of the region’s early
efforts to engage with the international financial
system (Argentina and Chile in the 1970s) anticipated
the models that would be so widely followed in the
1990s. The “Southern Cone liberalization
experiments” combined drastic financial and trade
reforms with macroeconomic arrangements involving
pre-set exchange rates and passive monetary policy.
The reforms included liberalization and deregulation
of capital flows, liberalization of local financial
markets and moves towards free trade. Fixed exchange
rates were meant to bear down on inflation. These
policy experiments resulted in moves towards financial
and trade liberalization and deregulation in situations
of plentiful external funding and with high fixed
exchange rates (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1993; Frenkel,
2002).
These 1970s experiments display the same
combination of local conditions and surging capital
inflows as were seen in the critical cases of the 1990s.
Furthermore, the processes to which the Southern Cone
experiments gave rise were similar to those that
subsequently led to the crises in Mexico, Brazil and
Argentina during the recent phase. Although the 1970s
experiences were shorter-lived than the recent cases,
the macroeconomic dynamic displayed the same cycle
of boom, bust and crisis.
Chile and, a little later, Argentina initiated their
new currency programmes in 1978. By late 1979, when
United States monetary policy raised interest rates,
Argentina and Chile already had large external debts
and substantial current-account deficits. From then on,
higher international interest rates further contributed
to external fragility. The crises broke out shortly
afterwards. The exchange-rate regime collapsed early
in 1981 in Argentina and in 1982 in Chile. External
financial markets closed to both these economies in the
latter year, and in both cases massive bail-outs of the
local financial system were organized at great fiscal
expense. Both countries went into deep recessions.
The rise in the international interest rate in late 1979
accelerated the process. What the two countries
experienced, however, had the hallmarks of an
endogenous cycle, with a turning point and subsequent
recessionary phase emerging independently of
international interest-rate movements. As in the more
recent cases, this cycle involved the domestic financial
system, movements in the external account and reserves,
and a rise in borrowing.
There are a number of reasons for discussing the
experience of the Southern Cone. Neither budget
deficits nor government guarantees for bank deposits
–potential sources of moral hazard– played significant
roles in the crises. Both were present in Argentina, but
Chile had a budget surplus and the bank deposit
guarantee had been abolished with the explicit aim of
making the financial system more efficient and less
risky.
IMF strongly supported these policy experiments.
In 1980 and 1981, when Chile was running large
current-account deficits, IMF argued that this situation
should not be a concern so long as it was not
accompanied by a fiscal deficit, which at that time it
was not in Chile.4 IMF subsequently took the same view
of the situation in Mexico in 1994.5 On both occasions,
the basis of the diagnostic was that rational behaviour
by the private sector would ensure that resources
borrowed from abroad were allocated efficiently and
would be repaid.
The crisis to which the Southern Cone experiments
led had a major intellectual impact. The Chilean case
was particularly striking because it contained all the
ingredients that ought to have guaranteed success and
stability, according to the fashionable theory that
underlay the country’s policies. The experiments were
based on a version of the modern “monetary approach
to the balance of payments”, the vision forged at the
University of Chicago in the heat of the recent
restoration of a world capital market.
Studies and debates dealing with the experience
of the Southern Cone gave rise to a body of economic
literature, the so-called “sequencing literature” (Fanelli
and Frenkel, 1993). The main conclusion of this
literature was that the crises had resulted from faulty
4
 See, for example, Robichek (1981), cited in Díaz Alejandro (1985).
5
 Michel Camdessus took a similar position on Mexico when he
visited that country in 1994.
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sequencing of the reforms. Basically, it was argued that
they were caused by premature financial liberalization.
The resulting policy recommendation was that capital
markets should be opened only once the economy had
been stabilized and was open to international trade, with
a robust financial system, i.e., only once a sequence of
policies had been applied (the policies that would later
form the core of the Washington Consensus) and the
effects expected from the first reforms had fully
manifested themselves.
What these observations show is that in the first
half of the 1990s, when there was a new upsurge in
capital inflows, there was no lack of historical
experience, analytical studies or policy
recommendations to provide a basis for examining the
processes then going on in Mexico and Argentina. The
Southern Cone experiments had taken place barely a
decade before and had been repeatedly analysed. Yet
the memory of these cases and the lessons drawn from
them were not mentioned by IMF, or in the work of
market analysts, or in much of the academic output.
Even more striking is the way the experience of the
Southern Cone and the sequencing literature were
forgotten by some of those who had participated actively
in that debate and contributed to the literature, and who
then came to hold important positions in the new phase,
such as Anne Krueger, the current Managing Director
of IMF (Krueger, 1986) and Sebastián Edwards, former
Chief Economist for Latin America at the World Bank
(Edwards, 1986).6 Such was the degree of memory loss
about the crises that the conventional interpretation which
became established after the Mexico crisis treated this
as though it were a bolt from the blue.
3. The cyclical dynamic leading to crisis7
The starting point for the cycle that characterized the
cases of the 1970s and 1990s was a combination of
local programmes with an upsurge in capital flows to
emerging markets. It is in fact the abundance of cheap
international financing that provides the preconditions
for the viability of such policy packages.
The launch of these programmes is followed by
massive capital inflows, an initial build-up of reserves
and high rates of money and credit growth. Internal
demand expands strongly and a bubble is inflated in
real and financial assets such as land, real estate and
shares. The effects on asset prices and on money and
credit volumes are very substantial, because the capital
flows are large in relation to local markets. Local
financial systems and capital markets are relatively
small and undiversified. The range of assets is limited
and the degree of bank intermediation low. The local
financial system, used to administering few resources,
is not equipped to allocate a burgeoning mass of credit
efficiently. Likewise, the authorities are not well
equipped to supervise a system that is growing rapidly
both in volume and in the number of intermediaries.
With a fixed or semi-fixed nominal exchange rate that
initially enjoys strong credibility, investment in local
assets yields high dollar returns. There are strong
incentives to take positions in local assets financed by
borrowing in international currency.
The real exchange rate is already high or tends to
appreciate in the expansionary phase because inflation
is higher than the sum of predetermined devaluation
rates (zero in the case of a fixed exchange rate) plus
international inflation. The pressure of rapidly
expanding demand on non-tradable sectors contributes
to currency appreciation.
Currency appreciation, trade liberalization and
growth in domestic demand cause imports to rise rapidly
and the trade deficit to widen. The current-account
deficit also tends to grow, slowly at first but then more
quickly as external debt mounts and the stock of foreign
capital invested in the economy grows. Relative prices
skew real investment towards non-tradable sectors. In
the current-account balance, consequently, rising
international currency returns for FDI are not matched
by export growth.
Movements in the external accounts and reserves
define one aspect of the cycle. The current-account
deficit rises steadily, while capital flows can change
abruptly. At some point the current-account deficit is
larger than capital inflows. Reserves then peak and
decline, resulting in a money and credit crunch.
However, the cycle is not determined exclusively by
this mechanical process: the scale of capital flows is
not an exogenous factor. The portfolio decisions of local
6
 We have drawn attention to the way the issue of reform sequencing
was “overlooked” in writings reflecting mainstream economic
opinion. Perhaps less striking (because it is more common) is the
total ignorance displayed of studies published in the Southern Cone
countries and by less conventional analysts, such as Frenkel (1980,
1983a and 1983b) and Damill and Frenkel (1987) in Argentina,
and Arellano (1983), Ffrench-Davis and Arellano (1983) and Díaz
Alejandro (1985) in Chile.
7
 This account is based on a model inspired by the experiences of
Argentina and Chile which is presented in Frenkel (1983a). The
model was synthesized and presented in English in Williamson (1983)
and Taylor (1991). It was also used in explaining the 1990s crises by
Taylor (1998), Eatwell and Taylor (2000) and Frenkel (2002).
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and external agents regarding the proportion of local
assets they hold –the portion of the agent’s portfolio
that is exposed to country or currency risk– are affected
by developments in the country’s balance of payments
and finances.
The domestic interest rate reflects the financial
aspects of the cycle. It tends to fall in the first phase
and rise in the second. Since exchange-rate policy
initially enjoys great credibility, arbitrage between local
and external financial assets and credits causes the rate
to fall in the first phase. Low interest rates contribute
to real and financial expansion. Under these
circumstances, financial fragility8 increases markedly.
In the second stage, the interest rate rises and episodes
of illiquidity and insolvency begin to appear, first as
isolated cases and then as a systemic crisis. What
accounts for the rise in nominal and real interest rates?
Because the financial market is open in both
directions, there is arbitrage between local and external
assets, as already mentioned. The local-currency interest
rate can be expressed as the sum of the international
dollar rate which the country has to deal with plus the
devaluation rate allowed for by the exchange-rate
regime (zero in the case of a fixed exchange rate), plus
a remainder answering to currency risk and local
financial risk. The international rate that the country
has to deal with, meanwhile, can be broken down into
two terms: the interest rate paid by the United States
Government (this is the base rate of the international
financial market) plus a remainder to compensate for
the risk of local dollar-denominated debt. Except in the
case of some exceptional debt instruments, the floor
for this is the premium paid by the dollar-denominated
bonds of the country’s government, known as the
country risk premium.
The sum of the currency risk premium and the
country risk premium –the aggregate price of
devaluation risk and default risk– is the main factor
determining local interest rates, so that when this
variable rises interest rates tend upward as well. A
steadily increasing current-account deficit (and, after a
certain point, the tendency of reserves to shrink)
undermines the credibility of the currency regime, while
at the same time the likelihood of default on the debt
issued increases. Increasing capital inflows are required
to sustain the currency regime and enable external
obligations to be serviced regularly. Consequently, risks
tend to be priced upward. High risk premiums, and
thence high interest rates, are required to balance
portfolios and attract capital from abroad. Economic
activity contracts and episodes of illiquidity and
insolvency serve to undermine further the credibility
of the currency regime. This dynamic proved explosive
in the cases studied. By the end of the process no interest
rate is high enough to sustain demand for local financial
assets. There are runs on Central Bank reserves, leading
ultimately to the collapse of the currency regime. In
the 1990s cases, the market was generally closed to
new issues when the country risk premium reached a
certain level.
The relative weight of the currency risk premium
and the country risk premium was different in the 1990s
from what it had been in the 1970s. The shift was due
to the different forms taken on by external financing in
the two decades. In the 1970s, financing came mainly
from international bank credits. The country risk
premium was then the surcharge over the primary
international rate charged by banks when lending to
the country. The secondary debt market was
insignificant. For Argentina and Chile in this context,
the currency risk premium was the main factor driving
interest rates higher in the second phase of the cycle,
while the lending bank surcharge played a minor role.
This can be explained by the behaviour of banks. Any
bank that already has part of its portfolio invested in a
country’s assets has an interest in preserving the quality
of that portfolio and the borrower’s ability to pay.
Consideration of the sunk portfolio influences decisions
about the scale and pricing of new lending.
In the 1990s, on the other hand, most financing
was raised by issuing bonds and other debt instruments
in a primary market in which there were many different
participants. The debt securities issued were traded daily
in an active secondary market. The country risk
premium was established by the continuous re-pricing
of securities in this market. In that decade, rising country
risk premiums, resulting from falling prices for the debt
securities of the country concerned in the global
secondary market, were the main driver of higher
interest rates in the contractionary phase of the cycle.
The debt market in this recent phase of globalization is
more volatile than the credit market of the 1970s. It is
more vulnerable to contagion and herd movements.
4. Budget deficits and public debt
The above analysis of developments in the economies
identifies certain stylized facts that were present in all
the processes leading to the crises considered. The8
 As defined by Minsky (1975).
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description of the stylized facts focuses on the linkage
between the finances and real economy of a country
and the international financial system. There is positive
feedback during the boom period and negative feedback
during the contraction. It will be noted that in the
description of national economies the private and public
sectors are not analysed separately. Budget deficits
financed with external capital are tacitly included
among the local destinations for capital inflows and
consolidated with the private-sector deficit. The external
debt of the public sector is part of the country’s total
external debt and is not analysed separately.
This approach is easily explained: fiscal
sustainability did not play a notable role in creating the
crises in Chile (1982), Mexico (1994-1995), Argentina
(1995) or Brazil (1998-1999), or in the Asian crises of
1997-1998.9
Now, a rapidly growing public debt which comes
to be viewed as unsustainable by the market that has
been financing it may of course be the root cause and
trigger for a crisis. Certainly there was a substantial
budget deficit and public debt in the Argentine crises
of 1981-1982 and 2001-2002, and these crises have
often been explained by reference to that circumstance.
The origin of the Argentine crisis of 1981-1982 is
not to be found in the fiscal accounts, however. In this
case, only half of the external debt was in the public
sector prior to the crisis and the military regime did not
seem to be having too much trouble adjusting the public
finances. The fiscal deficit and its external financing
were the result of government decisions which did not
raise any special problems. Government policy was
strongly endorsed by advisers who had signed up to
the “monetary approach to the balance of payments”
and maintained, at that time, that monetary policy and
monetary policy alone was what determined the
balance-of-payments outcome and the level of reserves.
As long as discipline and control were exercised over
domestic credit –it was argued– there would be no
problem in financing the public-sector deficit.
Furthermore, it was not the banks lending to the public
sector that brought on the crisis by restricting the supply
of financing or raising its price. The international banks
carried on supplying financing to the public sector at a
low premium until the last moments of the currency
regime. Both in the case of Argentina and in the parallel
one of Chile, the domestic financial crisis began to
manifest itself at least a year before the collapse of the
currency regime.
The 2001-2002 Argentine crisis was different. On
that occasion the public debt was the main component
of the country’s external debt. Analysis of the case
reveals the cyclical macroeconomic dynamic described
earlier, but side by side with a fiscal deficit and a steadily
growing public debt, largely financed from external
resources. This did not happen in the first cycle (1991-
1995) but in the second one, beginning in 1996, after
the crisis triggered by the Tequila effect.
The budget deficit had its origin in the social security
system. This was partly because of the reform
implemented in late 1994, whereby much of the system’s
revenue was transferred to the private financial sector10
while public pension spending was maintained, and
partly because the Government reduced employers’
contributions in an effort to improve competitiveness,
which had been weakened by currency appreciation. In
any event, in the second half of the 1990s the main
component forcing current public spending upward was
the interest on the public debt. The higher interest rates
characteristic of the contractionary phase of the cycle
directly impacted the growth of the public debt,
contributing to a perverse dynamic of higher
indebtedness and higher risk (Damill and Frenkel, 2003).
An investor’s sustainability analysis reveals many
sources of uncertainty in this case. Firstly, there is the
macroeconomic dynamic common to processes that
lead to crisis: the current-account deficit and external
debt increase, there is a growing need for capital
inflows, and the external financial fragility of the
economy as a whole also increases. In parallel with
this, the public debt rises and public-sector financing
needs grow.
The tendency for the country risk premium and
interest rate to rise may be associated with the situation
of the country’s external accounts or with developments
in the public finances. Or it may be associated with
both, as it in fact was in the reports of investment fund
analysts and risk rating agencies.
9
 If the public sector has some deficit to finance and has issued
some debt, the increase in interest rates during the contractionary
phase tends to widen the deficit and cause debts to accumulate
faster, in both the public and private sectors. As their crises neared,
Mexico and Brazil had trouble administering the public debt. But
this is not the point. What matters is the mechanism causing risks
and interest rates to rise, i.e., whether the original source of
uncertainty is to be found in the dynamic of the public accounts
and financing needs or in the dynamic of the external accounts and
financing needs. In Brazil and Mexico, the second phase of the
cycle was not brought on by fiscal problems. 10 To the Pension Fund Administrators (AFJP).
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Although doubts about the sustainability of the
public debt may have weighed significantly in investors’
risk assessments, however, this should not be allowed
to mask the original sources of the public-sector deficit
and debt. The main cause was not an extravagant fiscal
policy but the combined effect of external fragility and
contagion from the Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises.
The second cycle of the convertibility regime and the
recent Argentine crisis are not an exceptional case. In
accounting for it, the Ockham’s razor principle of
parsimony of assumptions suggests that the focus
should be on the stylized facts it has in common with
the other crises considered.
IMF and some analysts (in particular Michael
Mussa, former Chief Economist of IMF)11 are emphatic
in attributing the crisis to the budget deficit and the
dynamic of the public debt, without considering how
these originated. The implicit suggestion is that the
experiment would have been sustainable and the crisis
would not have happened had fiscal policy been
different.
Were it to acknowledge that the growth of the
public debt was largely an endogenous consequence
of the rise in the country risk premium, IMF would be
placed in an uncomfortable position and would be
obliged to look hard at its own actions. In the first half
of the 1990s, the institution gave both intellectual and
practical support to high fixed exchange-rate policies,
including the convertibility system adopted by
Argentina in 1991. Later, when the Mexican crisis made
the shortcomings of such exchange-rate policies plain,
IMF changed its diagnostic. The new approach
recognized the volatility of capital flows, and floating-
rate policies were now recommended. But a favourable
judgement was passed on fixed exchange-rate policies
with a high degree of institutional and legal rigidity,
such as currency board systems or dollarization. This
category came to be one of the “corner solutions”
accepted by the new orthodoxy (Fischer, 2001). The
umbrella of the new orthodoxy was broad enough to
cover the Argentine convertibility regime.
IMF commitment to the convertibility regime
culminated in the emergency financing granted to
Argentina in late 2000. The conditions did not include
any significant change in policy arrangements. This
support was clearly intended to extend the life of the
system, even though there were clear indications that it
was unsustainable. Multilateral resources ended up
financing debt service payments and capital flight. IMF
agreed to a disbursement in August 2001, when the
Argentine authorities were virtually alone in their
apparent belief that the system was still sustainable.
It is understandable that IMF might not wish to
dwell on that episode. Attributing Argentina’s
problems and crisis exclusively to fiscal variables is
convenient, as it relieves IMF of all responsibility for
the course of events and its disastrous consequences,
including not just those suffered by the people of the
country, but also the capital losses of foreign investors.
What is less understandable is that IMF should
subsequently have held out for so long against
providing a minimal level of support –rolling over
capital repayments due to it– for policies designed to
cope with the consequences of a crisis that had been
caused by policies previously supported by the
institution. Paradoxically, IMF officials justified this
reluctance by alluding darkly to “mistakes we made
with Argentina in the past”.
III
The diversity of regional experience
and “crisis prevention measures”
1. Experiences in the region
Section II gave a brief description of financial
globalization in the region during the 1990s. A closer
look at the routes followed by those countries in the
region that became emerging markets reveals significant
differences in the nature of the capital market
deregulation and liberalization measures taken, and in
the volume and composition of capital flows. Although
they were engaged in the same process, the countries
followed different routes towards international financial
integration.
These different routes are a defining aspect of each
country’s growth model. They are historical processes11 See Mussa (2002).
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in which the country’s engagement in the international
economy alters as a result of changes in its international
trade and the build-up of external debt and foreign direct
investment. This is reflected in changes in the balance-
of-payments structure. The route taken in each case is
influenced by the conditions obtaining at any given
time, and these depend on the policies, incentives and
relative prices of the moment, but also on previous
history. The variable that most obviously characterizes
this property of countries’ integration processes is the
stock of external debt as it relates to certain flows, such
as output and exports.
The routes that led to high debt levels and increased
vulnerability involved full capital-account deregulation,
currency appreciation and a passive role for monetary
policy. These were the cases where economic policy
was oriented towards full integration into the
international financial system and where capital flows
were an essential policy ingredient. A fixed nominal
exchange rate and full capital-account deregulation
entailed a passive monetary policy. Argentina
throughout the decade, Brazil from 1994 and Mexico
up to 1995 are instances where countries took these
more vulnerable routes.
By contrast, there were sounder routes to
integration. In these cases, economic policies focused
on growth and price stability and attached importance
to a competitive real exchange rate, so that they included
the real exchange rate among their objectives. Examples
are Chile and Colombia in the first half of the 1990s.
These countries adopted crawling band exchange-rate
regimes, regulated capital flows by setting rates that
differentiated by the type of flow (which meant
retaining some control over the currency market) and
implemented sterilization policies. These policy
packages did not fully meet all their objectives, but they
did result in more robust performance than in the other
cases referred to above.
A glance at the conditions obtaining in the region’s
countries before the boom in capital flows makes it
easier to understand these differences in policy stance.
In the cases of Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, the main
policy objective was to bring an end to a long period of
very high inflation and economic stagnation. The lower
inflation and rising demand and business activity that
characterize the first phase of capital inflows proved a
blessing in those cases. By contrast, Chile and Colombia
had been growing briskly since the mid-1980s and came
to the capital flow boom with comparatively low
inflation rates of some 30% a year. It is understandable
that these countries should have sought to defend the
stability of their relative prices and avoid the shocks
caused by a large injection of outside funds (Damill,
Fanelli and others, 1993; Frenkel, 1995).
Comparative analysis of these Latin American
experiences, combined with the negative and positive
lessons of other experiences, has made it possible to
distil a set of national policy recommendations to
forestall crises.
2. “Crisis prevention measures”
Firstly, there is consensus about the importance of
prudential regulations. Conventional regulatory criteria,
however, are largely procyclical. Consequently,
prudential regulation should not take account solely of
microeconomic risks, but should also consider
macroeconomic and systemic risks, such as those
deriving from currency misalignments and the build-
up of short-term foreign-currency debts (Ocampo,
2003). In any case, offloading the entire responsibility
for prudential regulation on to recipient countries
imposes heavy costs upon them.
The crises experienced leave no room for doubt
about the incompatibility of fixed exchange rates with
volatile capital flows. This lesson has been taken on
board by IMF, as mentioned above. In relation to the
exchange-rate regime, however, while there is
consensus about the need for flexibility, there is an
unfinished debate about the scope and benefits of
intervention in the currency market. IMF supports a pure
float and shifts the entire burden of price and exchange-
rate stability on to the anchor of monetary policy.
Despite this, most countries actually adopt intermediate
regimes of managed flexibility which include different
types of currency market intervention by the monetary
authorities.
Comparative analysis of the routes taken towards
integration has suggested other “crisis prevention
measures” focusing on the regulation of capital inflows
during boom periods. These regulations are based on
the experience of Chile and Colombia in the first half
of the 1990s and on the regulations maintained by some
Asian economies, such as Taiwan (Agosin, 2001).
A flexible exchange rate is enough in itself to
discourage certain types of short-term capital flows, but
a free float in situations of capital flow volatility can
result in the nominal and real exchange rate becoming
unacceptably volatile. Applying direct controls (or
reserve requirements for incoming capital, as in Chile
and Colombia) can help stabilize the currency market
and capital inflows and alter the time profile of the capital
49C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 0  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 3
GLOBALIZATION AND F INANCIAL CRISES IN  LATIN AMERICA  •  ROBERTO FRENKEL
that comes in, discouraging short-term flows. Over and
above its short-term stabilization role, the objective of
regulatory policy is to smooth out capital inflows so that
they behave as far as possible in a stable, predictable
way. ECLAC has led the way in promoting this policy
stance and outlook (ECLAC, 2002).
IMF came out against capital flow regulation, even
in the case of prudential regulations during boom
periods. The institution in fact went completely the
other way, seeking to make full deregulation of the
capital account compulsory for member countries.
Here, as with the exchange-rate issue, the IMF took
extreme positions that owed more to belief in the self-
stabilizing virtues of markets than to a careful weighing
of experience.
“Crisis prevention measures” embody the lessons
that can be drawn from the region’s experience, but
their recommendations are applicable at times when
there is an upsurge in capital flows. There are other
items on the regional and global agenda.
IV
Segmented integration and financing traps
1. External financing traps12
Those countries in the region that followed routes
leading to greater vulnerability tended to be caught in
financial traps. Argentina in 1998-2001 is a clear
example of this. Countries can find themselves in
financing traps even if they have already experienced
and overcome a crisis. In 1999, for example, Brazil
corrected the main features of its previous
macroeconomic policy arrangements. But this change
could not undo the structural legacy of the course it
had taken beforehand. Financial traps derive from two
main links between the economy and the international
financial market. The first link arises because of the
great volume of financing needs. The need to roll over
debt and finance large structural current-account deficits
becomes the main element in the country’s relationship
with the international financial market. This makes the
country highly vulnerable to the effects of contagion
or any other source of volatility. It also makes self-
fulfilling prophecies more likely. The market assesses
this situation and reacts by imposing high country risk
rates. The country loses freedom of manoeuvre in
economic policy.
The second link results from the effects on interest
rates and financial asset prices. The high country risk
premium makes external financing more expensive,
contributing to a further deterioration of debt indices.
Meanwhile, the sum of the international rate plus the
country risk premium sets the floor for the local real
interest rate. Integration of the emerging market with
the international financial market results in segmented
integration where the local interest rate is significantly
higher than the international one. The negative effects
of high interest rates on growth and on domestic and
external financial fragility were examined in some detail
above, and this point was highlighted as an element in
the dynamic leading to crises. What we would stress
here is the phenomenon of segmented integration, quite
apart from the crises to which it may give rise.
2. Segmented integration
Persistently high country risk premiums are an
unforeseen consequence of financial globalization.
From the outset, advocates of globalization presented
full integration between local financial systems and the
international system as the ideal state towards which
the process should ultimately converge. Full integration
entails a global system of intermediation in which the
yield of the public’s assets, on the one hand, and the
cost of capital for borrowers, on the other, are the same
for economically equivalent transactions, irrespective
of the geographical location of savers and investors.
Full integration –it was argued– ought to lower
intermediation costs and the cost of capital in
developing countries. Insofar as the relative situation
of developing countries offered greater business
opportunities, this should result in investment and
financing flows that would tend to close the
development gap.
Convergence towards full integration as a result of
the globalization process would have meant a steady12 See Frenkel (2003).
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reduction in country risk premiums. This has not
happened. On the contrary, the experience accumulated
since the Asian crisis suggests that globalization has
created a segmented system of integration in which the
cost of capital is, in many cases, systematically higher
in emerging market economies than in developed
countries.
To sterilize the effects of sovereign risk, it might
be thought that it would be sufficient to attain fiscal
balance and have no need of new public securities
issues. It could be argued –and many have done so–
that the problem lies exclusively with the finances of
the public sector. This is not the case. A country’s
finances may be in balance or surplus, but this does not
guarantee that its economy will have the necessary
foreign currency resources available to meet debt
service and repayment obligations in dollars.
Furthermore, it may happen that the government has
the foreign currency resources it needs to meet its own
requirements, but the wider economy does not, so that
the currency required to service the external private-
sector debt is unavailable (Frenkel, 2003). Under these
conditions, the authorities may be forced (or choose)
to suspend local currency convertibility –or to suspend
payments abroad, in the case of a dollarized economy–
and to force default on contracts. Sovereignty makes
this possible. Sovereign risk means more than the risk
of fiscal insolvency.
It seems hard to find a way out of financing traps
or, more broadly, to create an international context that
can prevent segmented integration unless a major effort
of international cooperation is made. Globalization has
created a system that lacks many of the institutions built
up over time in individual countries to improve the
workings and safeguard the stability of national systems
(Eatwell and Taylor, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002).
Until fairly recently it seemed as though some
progress had been made. The scale and consequences
of the Asian and Russian crises led the central countries
to go some way towards creating international
institutions responsible for supervision, crisis
prevention and organized crisis management. Some
currency was given to the idea that borrowers and
lenders had a joint responsibility and that adjustment
costs should be shared. After a period in which
initiatives were scaled back, however, as a degree of
complacency set in during 1999 and 2000, thinking
hostile to public intervention is once again in the
ascendancy. The massive IMF-led bail-out packages
were the only international policy initiative in this area.
They did indeed help prevent default in most cases.
The existence of this instrument did not stop crises
happening, however. Nor, particularly after the Russian
crisis, did it bring down persistently high country risk
levels or prevent financial traps from arising.
Things got worse. The role of bail-out packages
was significantly reduced, while the IMF, with its
Krueger initiative, envisaged international reform aimed
solely at facilitating negotiations subsequent to default.
But even this limited initiative has not prospered. The
prospects for countries with high risk premiums are
not encouraging.
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